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1 
I NTR ODUO fI O)l 
The Zero-sum Two-person Game 
ConsIder a contest among a set 01' players, where the 
skill ot the players'and, posslb17, chance events effect the 
outcom.e.Oall the set ot all rules 01' the contest the SaDle, 
and any particular oourse the contest may take, trom. begin-
ning to end, a :elil- Suppose the game presoribes, for any 
play, payments to the players. Profits are denoted by 
positive payments, and losses shown by negative payments. 
It 1s assumed that at most a tinite number of situa-
tions can arise in the contest. and,at each Situation, at 
most a finite number at alternatives is available to the 
player or chance device nlaking the choice in this situation. 
'men, eaoh ot the players oan speoify, previous to a play of 
the oontest, exaotly which ohoice will be made tor every 
possible situation in which he might have an option_ All 
Into~nation allowable under the game can be inoluded as a 
basiS tor a choice, so this pre ... specification entails no 
disadvantage to the player,. A complete --exhaust! ve and 
unambiguous-,. set ot such choices 1s oalled a. atra.teSl. ana. 
under the assumptIons made above, there is at most a tinite 
number ot strategies tor eaoh player. 
It ohance events nmy effect the outcome of the contest t 
oonsider all possible situations where a chance device may 
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2 
make a choioe, and select one ot these choices arbItrarily. 
Call a complete set of' such choioes an :wp;p&re's ohoice, and, 
trom the assumptions above. there is at most a tinite number 
ot umpire's choloes. Let the probabilIties tor any chance 
device's making its choioes be known. 'l~en. the probability 
ot ocourrenoe tor any umpire's choioe can be tound. 
It each ot the players selects a. strategy. and an 
UL~pire's choice is ohosen, a play ot the contest oan be eon-
structed, and payments assigned to the players. Sinoe an 
umpire's cholce has a detinite probability ot ooourrenoe, all 
possible umpire's ohoices can be Gonaldered, tor a tixed set 
ot players' strategies, and the mathematioal expeotation ot 
the payments oan be oalculated. Thus, tor eaoh set ot strat-
egies selected by the players, a set at payments (in the 
sense at expectation) oan be assisned the players. 
When the contest is between two players, its rules are 
oalled a two-~erson game. wben the sum at the payments is 
zero tor every possible play under the game, it is called a 
zero-sum game. A zero-sum two-person game desoribes a con-
test between two players where ona player wins exaotly the 
same pay:ment that the other player loses. Each player 
selects a strategy, and the ga:me then specities a payment 
which one player must make to the other. 
Let players Px and Py enter a contest under a two-
person zero-sum game. Suppose P
x 
has m possible strategies, 
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labeled l,2, ••• ,m, and Py has n possible strategies, called 
l.2 ••••• n. Let the payment to Px be Px' and the payment to 
Py be Py' Call the set of all strategies for eaoh player M 
or N respectively, with a typical element 1 or J. 'rhat Is, 
reading tJ~ft as "is (be) an elemen' otQ , one oan write 
1 ~ M. (l,I, ••• ,m), J ( • • (l,I, ••• ,n). 
1~en, the desoription above becomes, 
Px • px(I,J), Py • py(l,J), px(l,J) • - py (l,j). 
11'01' convenience, detinet 
81J • px(i.J) • • Py(l,J), i ~ M, j ~ N, 
A • (81j ). 
The domains ot 1 and J are independent ot each other, and 
A is an m by n matrix, called a RlX9tt matrlx. A:JlY' row ot A 
Identities a. strategy selection by Px' while any column ot A 
represents a seleotion ot a strategy by Fy• It both players 
want to realize a. most tavorable outcome, Px w1l1 wish to 
maximize, and Py will want to mintmlze, the entry ot A which 
·is ultimately seleoted by the intersection ot the row and 
oolumn ohosen by each ot the players. 
In a certain rational sense (1, pp. 98), a theory can be 
developed tor some, but not all, sames in the tormulation 
given above. However, the adoption of a decisive new oonoept 
in strategy selection will permit a rational theory which 
includes all zero-sum two-person games. 
Ithe consideration ot certain simple games, such as 
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matchins pennies (1, pp. 143), shows that a player may be 
outwi tte4 an4 punished 11' he is required to fHf)lect, on the 
basis 01' his own reasoning, a partioular strategy tor a play 
ot a oontest. In view ot this it 1s demanded only that a 
player state the probability with which he will playa 
particular strategy. That ls, instead ot seleoting a strat-
egy, let the player select a probability tor playing eaoh ot 
all posslble strategies. Call the probability 01' Px playing 
the ith strategy Xl' and the probab11ity 01' Py playing the 
Jth strategy 7J* The oollection of Xl is a vector in ~. 
Euolidean m spaoe, and the colleot1on ot Yj 1s a vector in 
En' say 
x • (Xi)' Y - (73). 
It the players seleot the sets ot probabilities, x and 
7, tor playing their strategies, the expeoted value tor the 
payoff will be 
where the oonvention of summing r.pee.ted indices through 
their domains ot detinition is adopte4. 
The sets x and y must be seta ot mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive probabilities. Use the detinitions. 
81- 1 tor all!, e .. (e1)' E" (e1J) • (.1e j). 
Then, the conditions on x and y become 
xe - X1ei- 1, 8y - 8373- 1, 
(1) 
(2) 
Xi ~ 0 tor all 1, YJ ~ 0 tor all J. (2a) 
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Il'he vectors x and y are oal.led m1x!d 8trat,e6ies. Let 
X be the set ot all x satisfying (2) and (28.), and Y be the 
set ot all y satistying (2) and (2a). The unit veotors ot 
Em and ~ are elements ot X and Y respectively. These unit 
veotors are called m!£l straie~'I, and represent an actual 
row or oolumn selection ot A. Heaoe, mixed strategies 
inolude all the previous notions on strategy selection. It 
turns out that the concept ot mixed strategies will permit 
the formulation ot a rational theory tor the playing ot any 
Properties ot Games 
It Is assumed that the reader Is aoquainted with the 
notions ot geometric convexity (1. pp_ 128) and the tunc-
tional operators Maxx and Minx (1, Pl>. 88). 
A statement ot the utmost importance in the theory ot 
games is due originally to john von Neumann. It is stated 
here without proof (1, pp. 153). 
Theorem. (Main Theorem tor zero-sum two-person games.) 
Let A be an arbItrary real matrix. Then there exist veotors, 
x· ( X, y. ~ Y, and a real number, A, such that ror every 
x E. X, Y ~ Y, 
(3) 
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In game terms, this theorem as.erts that Px has a mixed 
strategy, x·, whioh will gUarantee a payott ot not less than 
At while PY' has a mixed strategy, 1'., which will guarantee 
a payoff of not more than A. Thu., 6 is a point ot impasse, 
beyond whioh neither player need be allowed by an opponent. 
This point ot impasse. 6, is oalled the v@iue at the same A. 
A strategy. x· or y., which guarantees that an opponent will 
not be allowed a more favorable payoft than A is called an 
oRtlmal strategz_ A pair ot such strategies. x· and 1'. is 
oalled a sO.Btion. Let the set ot all x· be X·, the set at 
all yO be Y· It To emphasize the dependenoe at A, XO t yo on A, 
they may be written, A(A), XG(A). YO(A). 
Using these detinitions, the Main Theorem states that 
every zero-sum two-person game haa a value, and eaoh player 
has an optimal strategy which guarantees hlIIl that value. 
In a certain,sense, rational playing implies the use ot the 
optimal strategies, and the value ot the game represents a 
measure ot the utility of the game itself to the players. 
A game which has zero value is called a tail" game,. 
11118 main problem in the theory of the zero-su:m two-
person games at the present time 1s to find methods tor 
obtaining the va~ue and sets of optimal strategies ror a 
given game. 
Some well known properties ot games are given here. with 
demonstrations when space permits, and reterelloes otherwise. 
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ProPtrll 1, The Main 'rheorem can be given in the following 
equivalent torms. 
A. Let A be arbitrary. 'rhen there ekist vectors, 
x· ~ X, yO ( Y, and a number, A, such that, 
X01813 ~ A tor all 3. a131·3 ~ A for all 1. (3A) 
B. Let Abe arbitrary, and the domain ot x be X, the 
domain ot ,. be Y. Then, "KAy has a saddle point. That is, 
there exist veotors x· ~ X, yO ( Y such that, 
x·A,. ~ x·Ay° ~ xAyO tor ev.ry x ( x, Y ( Y. (3B) 
O. Let A be arbitrary, and the domain ot x be X, the 
domain ot y be Y. Then, 
~nyXAY lilt M1ty'faXz;XA7. (30) 
Properxl 3 f Let A and B be two games, y be a real number. 
A. Let B .. A ... yEt Then, 6(B) .. A(A ... yIO .. ,6(A) ... y. 
X·(B) .. X·(A) , YO(D) .. YO(A). 
B. Let y> 0, B .. yA. Then, ACB) .. ACrA) .. YD(A) , 
XO(D) .. XOCA), YO(B} .. Y·(A). 
Demonstration ot Property lA. Let x· ( X· and A be 
chosen by means ot the i4ain 'rheorem. It the relation, 
x01a13 ~ A tor all j, 
tails, suppose it tails tor j .. k. Let yt be defined as 
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Y'k /II 1, yt 3 • 0 tor J ., k.Then yt 4f, Y, and 
x·A.,' .. XOt8.tjY· j /II XOi&1k 1:. A. 
But the statement of the M.ain tl'heorem is precisely the 
relation denied above, hence the property Is shown as it 
regards to x. A symmetric argument will apply tor y. 
Demonstration ot Property lB, In the Main Theorem, 
let x /II x· ~ X·, ., /II y. ~ yo, Then, (3) becomes, 
x·Ay· ~ 6 ~ x°Ay., or A /II x°Ayo, 
substituting this relation back 1nto (3), one obtains (SB), 
whioh defines a saddle pOint (1, p. 95). 
Reference tor Property 10. (1, pp. 95). 
Demonstration ot Property 2. OU1Y'oonvexlty 1s shown. 
Let x· ~ X·, xot ~ xo, Then it must be shown that when 
o ~ a S 1, then XOfl • ttx· + (1 ... a)x·' ~ XO. Let., ( Y. Than 
x·flAy /II (ax· + (1 ... «)x·'lAy, 
/II ax°Ay' +(1 ... a)x~"Ay, 
~ aA + (1 - a)A /II ~. 
Hence, x· ft ~ :leo, A symmetriC argument holds tor yo, 
P'or the assertion that X· and Y· are hyper-polyhedra, 
See (2, pp. 3) and (2, p. 34). The statement appears to be 
plausible through an examination ot the form. ot Property lA, 
It Is easy to see there, that X·, tor instance, is the inter-
section ot the m + n halt-spaces, 
Xitiij ~~. tor all j, 
Xi ~ 0, tor all i. 
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and the hyperplane, ex • 1. 
Demonstration ot Property 3A. Let XO ~ XO(A), 
yO ~ YO(A). Then, tor every x ~ X, Y ~ Y, 
x°Ay > b{A) > XAYo • 
- -
Add Y to each member, and use the tact that tor every 
x ~ X. Y ~ Y, xEY. (x8)(ey) • 1. Then, 
XO Ay ... yxoEy ~ A (A) ... yo ~ XAy0 ... yxEy., 
x·(A ... rEly ~ ~(A) ... Y ~ x(A ... rE)yo. 
rJ~he last torm demonstrates that x· ~ X· (B), yO €, yo (B) , 
A(D) • A(A) + y. It XO ~ XO(B), yO €, YO(B}, a similar 
demonstration will show that XO E., X·(A), y. €, YO(A). 
Hence, the respective sets a.re identical. 
Demonstration ot Property 5B. Since y > 0, the 
three members in the statement ot the Main Theorem can be 
multiplied by y without altering the inequalities. '£.hen, 
the arguments used in Froperty 5A can be duplioated. 
Summary 
In the second ohapter, a bilinear expansion is 
developed with a two-told purpose. First, the expansion 
is an aid in the computation ot optimal strategies and 
values tor certain games. In addition, the expansion 
provides a basis tor the classitication and comparison 
of various games. While the derivation is algebraio in 
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charaoter, the set ot all expansion points is shown to be 
exactl~ the set ot all extremal points ot the oonstrained 
bilinear form obtainable by the method ot LaGrange multi-
pliers. However, additional treedom is obtained over ana-
lytic expansions by requiring that the expansion be ident-
ioal to the bilinear :function only in the intersection ot 
the hyper-planes ex • 1, and ey • 1. 
Some ot t11e main results ot the paper are obtained in 
the third ohapter, where ooncepts ot pun.ish.llent, limbo. and 
reward are used to develope crite;ria tor playing a game. 
All games are divided into two clasees by these oonoepts, 
and a complete description or the solutions and value ot any 
game can be given within the tr~.work ot these oonoepts. 
An operator, which arises naturally in the bilinear 
expansion, is treated in the fourth chapter. 'Ms operator 
div1des all games ot a given s1ze into equivalence classes, 
and the properties at these classes exhibit characteristics 
which seem pertinent to game theory. 
In the fifth chapter, areas are pointed out which might 
be traotable with an extension ot the analysis. ;Uso, a 
game occurring elsewhere in the literature is analyzed, and 
the ooncepts ot punishrllent, lhllbo. and reward are displayed 
in this example. 
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A BILIliEAR EXPANSION 
In this chapter, an expression, valid tor a certain 
olass ot matrices, will be round which has funotional values 
identical to xA1 when x and yare restricted by (2). If.he 
conditions tor existence tor such an expression a~e found, 
and a oomparison is laade with analytic expansions. 
Set notation will be used. In context, 0 1s the null, 
or empty, set. The interseotion Of sets X and Y, written XI, 
implies that it z ~ XI, then z ~ X and z ( Y. 
Derivation 
Consider the bilinear torm, 
%Ay • x18iJYJ' 1 ~ M, j ~ N, 
where x and y satisty, 
(1) 
(2) 
Call the set ot all x which satisty (2) X', and the set of 
all y whioh satisty (2) Y'. Thus. X is a subset of Xt , and 
Y is a s\lbset of X'. 
By means ot (2), detine a veotor, xP • (xPi)' formally 
by replaoing the component xp in x by (1 - XUeu)' a ~ Mp. 
v;here r,~ is the set M with p deleted. '!'hat is, 
xP a • xu' xPp • 1 .... Xaeo.' Ct t; ~. 
In a silnilar manner, using Nq as the set N with q deleted. 
define a vector, yq • (yqjl, by, 
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yq~ .. y~, yqq .. 1 - e~Ye' ~ ~ Nq • 
Also, let a set ot numbers wpq' w" (wpq), p ~ M, q ~ N, 
satisty, 
Lemma 1, Let x ( X', Y ~ Y'. Then, 
xAy .. WpqxPAJ'q. 
Proot. By the construoti on gi Yen t wtlen :x: ~ X'. Y [~ Y', 
x • xP, 1 .. yq, XPArq .. %Ay. 
Then, 
Lemm~ 2. A neoessary and sutticient condition that 
XPArq .. P + (x .. u)H(y - v) 
is that the following relations hold tor 1 ( M. J ~ Nt 
(4) 
(5) 
H • (111j), h1j .. alJ .. alq - &pJ + .pq' (6) 
U .. (Ut>, uihi3 .. apq " .p3' 
v .. (V3)' hi3v3 .. ap~ .. a1q' 
p + UlhijVj .. a,q-
Proof. First, write xPJ\yq out as 
xPAyQ. .. xaaafiYfl + (1 - xu_a: hip~Yf3 ... xaa(lq (1 .. epYe)-
... (1 .. xaea1.pq{1 - e~Y~)t tt ( MP' ~ ~ Nq• 
Then, rearrange this expression, with the reSult, 
xPJ\1q ... pq - xu(apq .. ~q) - (apq .. a~)rf3 
... xa(8ue - Baq - ape + .pq)Yfl' a ~ Mp. f3 ~ Nqe 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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It is easy to verity the tact that the domains of a and e 
Can be formally extended to include p and q respectively, 
tor having done so, the ooetfioients ot xp and Yq beoome 
identioallY' zero. Now, consider the tON, 
K .. P + (Xi ... 111) h13 hi' J ... v J ) t 
.. P + uihiJVj ... xihiJvJ ... ulhiJ1J + XlhljvJ. 
K and xPAyq are polynomials in the same variable (vaouously 
in xp and Yq) and will be identical it and only if their 
ooefficients are equated. Relatioh.s (6) t ('1) t (8), and (9) 
are the statements ot those equalities. 
Relations ('1) and (8) do not determine up or vq• 'rheir 
detinitions are taken to be, 
11e .. 1, ev .. 1. (10) 
Let the set ot all u satistying (7) and (10) be U, and the 
set ot all v satisfYing (8) and (10) be V. 
Lemma 3, Let U , 0, V , O. Then, U, V, and p are all 
independent ot the indioes p and q. In addition, 
u ~ U it and only it 11 satisties (10) and 
11i(8.1.1 ... aik) .. 0,1 E. M, J f,. Nt any tixed k ~ N. ('It) 
V ~ V it and only it v satisties (10) and 
(ai 3 ... akj)"J .. O. i ~ M. J Ii, !-l, any tixed k E, M, (8 t ) 
and tinally, 
p .. uAv. u ~ U. v ~ V. 
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Proot. It (6) and (10) are used 1n (7), 
ul(alj .. alq .. s.pJ + Bpq> • ~q ... pj' 
ui(a!j .. alq) ... Ulel(S.pq .. 8 pJ l • 8.pq .. ap3' 
ul(aiJ .. alq) .... pq .. s.pJ • apq .. Spj_ 
'I'hat Is, 
Ui{Sij .. Siq) • 0, 1 ( M, j ~ N. 
Let j • k. any fixed element ot :N and subtraot trom above, 
ui(aij .. 8iq) .. ui(aik .. S.iq) • ui(aij .. aik) • o. 
All operations used in the reduotion are reversible, hence 
(7t) oan be used with (6) and (10) to obtain (7), and (7') 
is thus equivalent to (7). The tor.m ot (7') shows that U 
is independent ot p and q. A symmetric argument and 
reduction will demonstrate the asaertlons tor v. 
Vfuen U ; 0, V ; 0, the relation slven by (5) exIsts, 
tor hij and p are polynomial tuno'ions of 8ij' ui' Vj and 
always exist tor.mally. Let x • u ( UJ Y • V ~ V. Then, 
x ( X', Y ( yt, and the conditions ot Lemma 1 are satistied. 
Using this substitution, then, one obtains, 
UAT • uPAvq • P ... (u .. ulRev .. v) • p. 
Irhis torm shows that p is independent ot P and q. 
By Lemma 3, the entire dependenoe on p and q ot the 
relation given in Lemma 2 is oontained in B. With this in 
mind, let the notation tor H be altered to Hpq • (hpqIj), 
~qlj • &lj - 6iq ... pJ + ~q. (6 f ) 
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An inspeotion ot (6') shows that, 
hpqlj .. hljpq ..... hpJlq ..... htqpj' 
and, as was notEJd ill Lemm.a 2, 
~qpj .. hpq1q .. Dpq,pq .. O. 
Let a linear combination ot Hpq oye~ the indices p and q 
with coefficients from W restricted by (4) be written as, 
(11) 
Let t be an arbitrary vector in Em, and g be an arbitrary 
vector in En- Then, two additional types of matrices are 
defined as, 
(12) 
F is a matrix at constant rows, while G has constant columns. 
Lemma 4;. Let X E. X', Y E. yt, U f.. tT, v ~ V, C f.. (E,F,G). Then 
(x .. u)C(y .. v) .. O. 
IJroof. When 0 .. E, 
(x ... u)E(Y", v) .. (ex. eu)(ey - ev), 
.. (1 .. 1) (1 ... 1) 
.. (0) (0) .. O. 
lfilhan 0 .. Jr, the right zero tactor exhibIted above will again 
be zero, and when 0 .. G, the lett zero factor will again be 
Let D, i, Jr, and G be defined as above, and y be an arbitrary 
number. Then, 
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B .. D • yE ... F + G 
1s a mapping ot A which is a tunc'lon 01' W, y, i, and g. 
wrlttenout, an entry at B in (13) 1s, 
blJ .. wpq(alJ .. 8.Iq .. 8.pJ .... pq) + y ... 1'1+ Sj' 
and 1s formallzed as, 
B- 'l'{WIJ,y,fl 'SJ)A .. 'l(W,y,t,g)A" *fA. 
Call the set ot all m.atr1ces .atl.tying (13) T(A). 
(13) 
The reader may note that TCA) may be written as the 
set 01' all matrices ot the form A ... F' • Gt, where Jr' and 
Gt are arbItrary 01' the type detiDed in (12). However, the 
arguments ot T w111 be seen u1t.1mately to d1splay oertain 
charaoteristics 01' the matrix· TA whloh seem pertinent to 
the invest1gation. ~'or this reason, the 1'irst tormulation 
is chosen, though it Is, adm1ttedly, more oomplex. 
~12lem 1. Let U ; 0, V ; O. It u ~ U, v e-. V. B €. T(A) , 
and x (X' t Y E. 'It., then. 
XA1 -u.Av ... ex ... u).8(y .. v). 
Proof. Use Lemma 1, to obtain, 
xA'¥ .. wpqxPAtl, 
whioh can be wrItten, by means at Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, 
x.A:y - Wpq (p ... (x .. u)Bpq ty ... v) • 
.. uAv + (x ... u)D{zr .. v) .• 
(14) 
By Lemma 4. yE + F + G Oan be added vaouously to D. Hence, 
XAy • uAv + (x • uJB(y .. v). 
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Lemma 5. U; 0 it and only If th.re exists no t satisfying. 
At ... , et .. o. (7.) 
v ; 0 lr and only ir there exists no s satisf'ying, 
sA .. e, se .. o. (Be) 
Proof. U; 0 it and only it the ooetflcient and augmented 
matrices in relations (7 t ) and (10) have the s~~e rank. No 
linear oombination at the right sIde of (7') oan give the 
right side of (lO). Hence, U ; 0 it and only it there exists 
no set or numbers, tjt J E. Nt suoh that, 
(o.i3 - alk)tj .. 1 tor all 1. 
It such a set ot numbers does exist, multiply these rel8:'" 
tions by t k• and sum over k, with the result, 
- s'lft.jektk ... aiktkejtJ .. ektk-
'£he lett side at this is easily a.en to be zero, henoe, 
8t .. o. 
Use this tact in the first expression, and obtain, 
(813- slk)tJ .. aiJtj .. &1keJtj .. 1 tor all 1. 
The seoond term ot the oenter member is zero, and. 
At l1li e. 
Thus, it U .. 0, a t exists, satisfying (7e). On the 
other hand. let t exist satistylns ('Ie), then, 
(&13 - a1k)t j • alJ t J .. 1, 
and U • O. Hence U .. 0 it and only it there arleta a. t 
satistying ('Ie) J and the first statement of the Lemma 
tollows in~d1ately. A symmetric argument holds tor V. 
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The statement ot Lemma 5 gives conditions tor the 
existence ot the expression given in Irheorem 1. When it is 
square,the conditions reduoe to the taot that the sum at 
the cotactors ot A must not be zero. 
Oomparison with Analytio Expansions 
The torm ot·the expression in '!I}).eorem 1 suggests a 
oomparison with analytic expansions ot XAyabout extremal 
points in X' and yf. 
Lemm! 6, A ~ T(A). In particular, let W satisty (4). Then. 
A .. T(W1j,-Wpqapq,ElpWpqa!qtWpqeqSpJ)A. 
Proot. A typical entry ot an ele.mentotT(A) 1s 
b13 .. wpq(alJ .... aiq .... spJ + &pq) + Y + t1 + 8J. 
• 81J + (- .pWpqBiq + til + (- Wpqeq8pJ + 8J) 
+ (wpqapq + y). 
Now y, t. and g are completely arbi tra17. 'rhus. tor any 
tixed W, the last three terms ot the latter express10n will 
vanish it a suitable set ot definitions is taken tor y, t. 
and g. Such a set is displayed in the arguments of T in the 
statement ot the theorem. 
It the method at LaGrange multipliers 1s used to tind 
extremal p01nts in X' and Y' at xAr, w1th multipliers a and 
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~, the extremal pointe, u' and V', satisfy these relations, 
u'A • ae, u'e • 1, 
Ay' • ae, av' .. 1. 
Let the set ot all such u' be ut , and the set ot all such 
v' be V'. It U' r} 0, Y' r} 0, the analytic expansion is, 
ZAr .. utAv' + (x .. u')A(y - T'l, u' ~ U', v' ~ yr. (14a) 
Lemma 7. UteA) .. U(A), Vt{A) • veAl. 
Proot. Let z ~ V'(A). Then, 
zl(aiJ - aile) 1l1li Cl .. Cl .. 0, ze .. 1, 
hence, z ~ U(A). Now let z (U(A). Then (k is fixed), 
Zialj .. z1a1J .. zl(alj .. aik) .. zialk .. a. ze .. 1, 
henoe. z e. u t (A) • A symm.etrl0 arsument holds tor V, V t • 
It is interestIng to note that th$ value ot the multiplier, 
a, 1s U'AV', the funct10nal value ot the extremal point. 
Also by symmetry', ~ • u .. utA.,.' .. uA.v • p. 
Cor211m ~. It an analytic expaulon of the type (14a) 
exists tor xA7, then this expans10n 1s given 1n (14). 
Proof. By Lennaa 6, A ( T(A), a.nd by Lemma 7, U' (A) .. U(A), 
V' (A) .. V(A). 
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~~en UtA) ; 0 and veAl , 0, A w1ll be oalled a regular 
game. In t1'.1is chapter, concepts of pun1sl'.tm.ent, limbo, and 
reward are 1ntroduoed tor regular games.. Homogenei t1 and 
convexity principles are found tor these oonoepts wlUoh lead 
to simple 01'1 teria tor choosing optimal strategies.. l?inally, 
use 1s made ot these ooncepts to exPress the value and the 
optimal strategy sets tor any regular game. It is assumed 
tor the remainder ot this chapter that A is regular. 
Simple Game. 
Certain g~es become tractable immediately by means ot 
the expression 1n Theorem 1. 
Lamme. 8, Let XU(A) ; O. Then A(A) ~ uAv, u ~ UtA), v ~ VeAl. 
Let ¥V(Al ; o. Then A(A) $ uAv, u ~ U(A), v ~ V(A). 
Proot. By the Main Theorem, there exists a yO ~ Y· such 
that tor every X c, X, 
A(A) > XA:f0 • 
-
It XU(A) t} 0, let X III U €, X, and use Theorem 1. Then, 
6.(A) > uAYo III uAv + (u - u)A(yO - v) III uAv. 
-
f!'he outside members ot this inequalitY' give the first 
statement. Asymmetrio argument will show the statement 
tor Y'l(A) ;: O. 
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Tb.~.o£eDl 2. Let Xt1(A) ; 0, YV(A) ,. 0, and u E.Xt1(A), 
v E. YV(A). '!'hen, A(A) 111 UAv, U E, X·, v E. y. ~ 
Proot. Both statements ot Lemma 8 are valid, and, 
uAv 2: A(A) 2: uAT. or A(A) 111 uAV. 
By Theorem 1, tor every x ~ X, Y ~ Y, 
uAy • uAV + (u ... u)A(y - v) .. uAV, 
%Av .. uAv + (x ... u)A(V ... v) .. uAT. 
Combine the last three eq.llations and obtain, 
uAy .. 6(A) .. %Av tor every x ( X, 1 E. Y. 
'rhis torm demonstrates that u ( X-, v E,yo, 
The solution found in Theorem 2 (where the inequality 
signs on both sides aTe deleted) 1e called a s~mn.e ~olu~lon. 
A game which has only sim:ple solu"lons will be cal-led a 
simple same. There exists a procedure whicb will find all 
solutions ot an arb.i tr&1'1 game, b;r finding simple games 
derived trom the arbitrary game. i~ a finite number ot steps. 
The procedure 1s described in (2, Pl'. 27). 'Vihen neither 
player has an optimal strategy with a zero component, the 
game is called a comnletell miileA im!!.-
trheorem 3. l ... et A be a. simple game. Then, X·. m(A)" 
yo .. YV(A) , A{A) .. uAv, u ( UtA), v ~ veAl. 
Proot. By tbe definition ot a sim.ple game, and the Main 
~~eorem, th$re exist X·, Y· such that it x· ( X·, y. E, Y·, 
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then to~ every x ~ X. Y ~ Y, 
x·Ay • A(A) ,. sAy·, 
In partloUlar. this must hold whea x and '1 are unit veotors. 
Written In. component tOrlll, therela.tion beoomes, 
X0181J • A(A) ,. 8.1JYCtJ• tor all 1 andj. 
But. 8.8 demonstrated in Lel'm.'Lta'1, 'these are equivalent 
detinl1;lo11s to (,t) and (13') tor U and V. Hence, x· €. U(A), 
yO t; 'leA). JUSO, x· ~ x, yO Fl, Y. and this means that 
x· ~ XU(A). y. ~ YV(A). Eythe r~ln Theorem, an XO and y. 
exist, henoe, m(A) ; O. YV(A) ,0. 'lhen Theorem 2 applies. 
and the entire statement ot the theorem tollows immediately. 
With the aid of: the conoepts of punishment, labo, and 
reward, It will be easy to see that a Oomplete17 mixed game 
Is a simple game with unlq,ue elements in its U and V. 
J\1"t1 t10lal Games 
Artificial gam.es are devIlled in this seetion in order 
to study the struoture ot non-simple games more extenslve17_ 
1~e definition ot such aD arbitrar,y game is suggested by a 
general1zatl~n of the Main Theorem. 
Let M be an arbitrary m by m matrix, and oonsider the 
transformation, 
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Let the set ot all such z be X(M). S1m11arly, when N 1$ an 
arbitrary n by n matrix, let the set o~ all zt defined by, 
zt .. Ny, T ( Y, 
be Y(N). X(M) and yeN) are convex hyper-polyhedra ot 
dimensions not more thaJl their generators. X and Y. 
Le~1 2. Let A be arbitrary, x have domain X(M), , have 
domain Y(N). Then, 
~u.nyxA7 .. lIiU.~yA1. 
Proof. Let x' have dOl:a&in X, " have domain Y, B .. MAN. 
Then, apply Property 30 to a, x', " to obtain, 
Max;d.nyxA7 - Maxx,Miny'x 'MANt' • 
.. Maxz·MlllytX'By', 
.. MlnytMaxx t x t By', 
-Mlny.MuxtXfMANyt I 
"M1~. 
For the present purpose, M aDd N will be taken such 
that X is a subset ot X(M) , and Y is a subset ot Y(N). 
'l'h.Ei/n. 14 and N must be non-singular, and satisty, 
)(e - e, eN • 8. 
fJ:he entire prooeeding can be regartled in two ways. P'irst. 
the players keep their strategy sets, X and Y, but playa 
new game, B • MAN. Otherwise, the players alter their 
strategy sets '0 X(M) and Y(N). and play the original game, 
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A, over the new strategy sets. 'rue ohapter uses the latter 
point of view, along with conditions on M and N. 
Let M be such that X is a subset at XeM) , but otherwise 
arbitrary. Let N .. I, the identity matrix. Then yeN) .. Y. 
Call such an arbitrary geme A(K), and regard the game fi"om 
the point of view ot Px • 'Ity is restricted to T, but Px has 
the additional freedom ot XC»:). An examination at the game 
A(M) oan be made, and methods inv.atlgated by which Px can 
reduce strategy choices tram X(M) to X with minimum loss. 
In a symmetrio way, a game, A(N),ls detined where 
M .. I, and Y is a subset ot yeN). Here, the additional 
treedomis given to Fr. and A(N) becomes a tool tor the 
investigation ot A by Py_ 
V~en Px selects an :It ~ X(M) in A(}~, the least tavorable 
payoff will occur when Py selects a ya E. Y suoh that, 
XAya a Ii1~Ay, -jA .. yu(X). 
Px wishes to maximize the payoft, and will try to ohoose an 
xm ( :I(M) suoh that, 
M1~A1. MaxxM1~. 
If xm ~ X, an optimal strategy tor A has been round. 
It :J!I " X, then Px must ohange hi. strategy when playing A. 
It turns out that oertain criteria can be established in 
making the change trom :x: (114) to X. 
The prooeeding in A(N) 1s s1m11ar, except that Py 
wishes to minimize that payoff rather than maxl1u1ze 1t. 
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Let It f.. X(M) , y f.. Y, u ~ UtA), v E. VeAl. Then, 
rJI1~ .. Miny.(llAV ... ex .. U)A(y .. v)) J 
.. nAv ... MlUy(X • U)A(y .. v), 
.. uAV ... m(x) t 
where, 
m(x) .. 1V11n,(x ... u)A(y .. v), x f.. X(M). y t:. Y. (15) 
Also, let x f.. X, Y E. yeN) J U E. UtA). v f.. V(A).. Then, 
~ .. Ma~(w\.v ... (x .. u)A(y .. v)} J 
.. uAv + !~(x .. U)A(y .. v) • 
.. uAV .. nCy). 
where (note minus sign), 
n(y) .. - Iv1a:xx (x .. u) A(y ... v). Xf.. Xt Y f.. Y(N). (le) 
l?x will wish to select x to llIElxim.1ze m(x), tor this will 
maxim1ze M1~Y. 1>y will also want to maximize n(y), tor 
this will m1n1m1ze ~xA:y. The use ot the ml.nus sign in 
(16) makes the desires ot the players with regard to their 
respeotive functions, melt) andn(y>, identical. By this 
means, then, aoompletely symmetrical. desoription of the 
oriteria tor the two players will be possible. Note that the 
operators I~xxJ r~ny are defined over X, Y respectively. 
petlnition ;L. It m(x) < 0 or n(y) < 0, x or Y' is a point 
ot ;Qunlshmen:t. If mC:} .. 0 or n(y) .. 0, x or 7 1s a point 
of' ~lmbo. If' m(x) > 0 or n(y) > 0. x or )" 1s a po1nt 
ot r!.'!a£d. 
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Let P be the set o~ all points of punishment tor either 
player. L be the set of all point. ot limbo, and R the set 
o~ all pOints ot reward. Then tor Pxt tor example, 
P + L + R • X(M) , PL • La • RP • O. 
Let PCp), a subset at P, be the set at all points with a 
punishment not more than ?, and Rep). a subset ot R, the 
set ot all points with a reward not less than p. Take p > 0 
always in either case. Then tor PY' say, 
y ~ pep) implies .... p S nCy) < 0, 
y E.. L implies n(y) - 0, 
y E.. R(f)) implies n(y) > p > o. 
-
Homogeneity and Convexity in 
I~isbment, Limbo, and Reward 
It x is rewritten a8 U + (x • u), it is easily seen that 
u + y(x .... u). y > 0 
is a halt-ray with its origin at 11 in the direction (x ... u). 
The halt-ray does not contain the origin. u. ~~en y < 1, 
a particular value, a point is represented by the expression 
which 11es between u and x. It y > 1, a particular value, 
the point lies beyond x trom u. 
Similarly, the expression, 
v + y(y .. v), y > 0, 
is a halt-ray with the s~~e connotation as described above. 
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The91em 4, Let:x ( it(M), u f. U, Y ~ O. Then, 
m(u ... rex .. u» .. yttt(u ... (x .. u» .. ym(x). (17) 
Let '!I ( yeN), v ( V. y?! O. Then, 
n(v + y(y ... v)) .. yn(v ... (1 .. v)) .. yn(y). (la) 
Proot. By (15), y f. y, and, 
m(u ... y(x .. u» .. ~nny(u ... r(x .. u) .. u)A(y .. v) 
.. Idln,r(x .. U)A(y" v), 
.. yMlny(x .. u).A(,. - v) • 
.. ym(x) - ym(u ... ex ... u). 
The second statement follows a similar argument using (16). 
Cgrollarl ih m(llA:) 1s a subset 0'1 L, VY(.N) is a subset ot L. 
l~oof. Let Y - 0 in Theorem 4. Il'b.en m{u) -0. Asimilar 
argument holds tor VY(N). 
Theorem 4: establishes U and T as centers ot homogeneity 
in punishment, 11mbo, and reward. By Corollary 2, U and V 
themselves contain only limbo poiats. It any point ot a 
half-raY' has the property of pUnitllmlent, limbo, or reward, 
then every point of the halt-raJ has the same property. Both 
the punishment and the reward inonase as the point moves 
away :trom. the origin of the halt-ray. u or v. .11'rom the 
point ot view ot either player, the punishment should be 
minimized, and the reward maximia8d. It a player is required 
to ohoose a strategy trom a halt-ray- with origin u or v, 
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Theorem 4 ma.kes the ello! co an· easJ one,. Sinoe every PQint 
of a halt.ray has the same property, the bait-ray may be 
reterred to as a. pWlis:b.'ment. limbo, or reward half-ray. 
P£!itel"!OQ;&t Let a pl8.,.e1" t $ oho1H ot strategy be restrioted 
to a closed subsetot a half-ray with origin u or v. 
On e. punishment half-ray, the player sbould select the 
strategy nearest u or v. 
On a 11Il1bo halt-ray, the player may select any stra.tegy 
ot the subset. 
On a reward balt-rtll.l. the player should seleot the 
strategy farthest from u or v. 
In particular, thlscriterion can be used in applying 
A(M) or A(N) to A bycons1der1ng the intersection of a given. 
b.alt-.ray w1 tll it or Y. Ii' U I. X or v I. Y, the intersection 
will be olosed, and the ol"lterlon wIll be valId. 
Points of a subeet ot ~ or En can be desoribed 1n terms 
of a fIxed set ot veotors w1 tb orisins u or v. 11'01' instanoe. 
oonslder the dftserlptlon ot x t; X in the following way. 
Write the unit vectors ot ~ as .1. Then. 
x • X18 1 • u + (x181 ... u) • u + %1(.1 - u). 
From a practIcal standpoint, this fixed set has adVantages In 
that all ooetti,ciente (the %j) ar. positive. and that the 
property of eaoh halt-ra11n the set 1s 89.SY to oaloulate. 
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Lemma .0. L$t x e, X(M) t xt e, XU"). 0 ~ a ~ 1. '!'hen, 
m(ctX ... (1 .... «) x') > CImex) +(1 .... a)m(x'). (19) 
-
Let Y E. Y(N), yt E. Y(N), 0 S ct .:$ 1. 'I'll,en, 
n(tty + (1 ... a)yt) .~ an(y) ... (1 .... a)n(y'). 
Proof. Il'he proot 01' (19) will make use ot (15), and the 
inequality, 
Miny(t(y) ... g(y» ~ Ml¥(;y) ... 111ny.s(y)' 
Using these, one obtains, 
m(ctx'" (1 .... a)x') • l~ny(a.x ... (1 .... «)x' .... u)A(y .. v), 
• Min,(a.(x .... u)A(y ... v) 
... (1 - a)(x' .... U)A(y ... v)), 
i:~l!i¥ (x ... u) A(y ... v) 
... ~ttny(l ... G}(x' ... U)A(y ... v), 
~ a~any(x ... u)A(y ... v) 
... (1 ... u)W4ny(x' ... u)A(y - v), 
> a.m(x) ... (1 ... a)m(x'). 
-
'me statement ot (20) can be shown similarly. It turns out 
tl~t the operator ... 1~ gives the inequality in the same 
direction as ~tlny. That is, 
• M~(t(x) ... S(x}) ~ (- Mu::JI(x) ... (- Me.~g(x)). 
By means ot this lemma, the tollowing two theorems 
charaoterize the sets, R(p) and pep). 'rhe oonditions tor 
the characterization at pep) may seem especially stringent, 
but later results will support them. 
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ThIP;rem I. R (p) :1s convex. 
Proof. Let x ~ R(p). xt ~ R(p), 0 < u < 1. Then it must be 
- -
shown that ax + (1 .... «)x' • x" ~ R(p). Use Lemma 12. Then, 
m.(ax + (1 .... (I) x') ~ «m(lt) + (1 .. ahn.{x') t 
~ up + (1 .... alp • p > o. 
Uence, x" f.. R(p) and l1(p) is convex. 
Theorem &t Let Z be a convex sub .. t of Xt or Y'» and in 
addition, let ZP • Z. Then, ZP(p) :1s convex. 
Proof. Let x e" zp(p) t x' e. ZP(p). O.s a S 1. ~en:1t must 
be shown that ax + (1 - a)x' • x" e" ZP(p). Use the convexity 
of Z, ZP • Z, and Lemma 12. Then, 
o > m(ax + (1 .. (1)X') > am(::) + (1 .... «)m(x t ) 
-
~ .. up .. (1 .. alp • .... p. 
Hence, x" f.. ZP(p), and ZP(p) is convex. 
Consider the set of all point •. wi.th reward exactly p .. 
By Theorem 5, this set 1s oontaintd in a convex set. 
Consider one such pOint and by combining the statements ot 
Theorem 4 and Corollary 1, notice that the point is not an 
element of U or V, hence there exists a halt-ray ,dth origin 
u or v through the point; then every neighborhood of this 
point contains a point ot the halt-ray not in R(p). that 1s. 
every neighborhood ot a point with reward exactly p contains 
points not in R(p). Thus. the set ot all points with reward 
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exaotly- p lies on the boundarY' ot R(p). On the other hand, 
it a point has reward different trom p, say ~, this point 
l1es on the boundary ot RCe), and 1s a tinite distance along 
a halt-ray trom u or v tram the boundary at R(p). 2be 
boundary ot Rep) oannot l1e along a halt-ray tor a finite 
distance, henoe, the set ot points with reward exaotly p is 
the boundary ot the oon",·ex set n (p) • Similarly t the set at 
all points at punishment exactly p 1s the boundary at PCp), 
and under the conditions ot Theorem 6, Is the boundary ot 
a convex set. 
14t Px consider all sets at equ.i-reward or equ1-
punishm.ent paints in A(M). In X(M) , which is supposed to 
contain X, tllese sets may intersect X or not, depending on 
the n~g.nitude of the punishment or reward. In view ot 
Criterion 1, it is wiShed to select a strategy in X in 
suoh a we.:1 that every nelgb.bortlood of the strategy oontains 
pOints not in X. On the other banA, It suoh a strategy 1s 
sele~ted t and other points ot Its .qui-reward or stIu1. 
punishtnent set have neIghborhoods contained completely in 
:I. then Theorem" says a greater reward or a less punish-
ment oan be obtained along a. ray through u and the point. 
Henoe. P
x 
should tind a set, R(p) or P~p) whioh has a non-
empty interseotion with X, but which has no point \nth a 
neighborhood contained entirely in X. This set Is, then, 
tangent to X. It the oondltions of Theorem 6 hold, the 
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intersection ot' the sets in either case will be oonvex. 
Cr1;ter10n 2, Let either player be required to select a 
strategy from,a convex subset of :x or Y respeotively. which 
contains e1ther only points ot pua1s~nent or only points 
ot reward. Then, the player should select a strategy from 
the eonvex subset ot X or Y which 11es in the oonvex set 
ot tangency between a set ot equi-reward or equ1-punislnllent 
and the given subset. 
The oompletely mixed game can be disposed ot at this 
time. Suppose A is oompletely mixed. Then no optimal 
strategy tor either player has a zero component. 1.e. no 
optimal strategy lies on the boundary ot X or Y. Th1s means 
the optimal strategies are not chosen from a punishment 
set or 8. reward set; henoe they must be ohosen trom limbo 
sets of the two players. But the.. opt1ma1 strategies 
cannot be ohosen tram a limbo halt-ray, tor otherwise 
Criterion 1 says points on the bOWlde.ries ot X and Y would 
also be optimal. l~us, the point. must be chosen trom U 
and V. Again, U and V must each have a unique element, tor 
otherwise, Theorem ! says points on the boundary would be 
optimal. Hence, the unique elements u ~ U(A), v ( V(A) are 
optimal strategies, and the game 1s simple. 
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Solutions :for Hegular Games 
The pun1shtlent _ limbo, and r.ward sets belonging to 
the two players stem trom. two difterent considerations ot 
the same matrIx, A. Some ot the interdependenoes involved 
in this are demonstrated here. 
~!!! ~lt Let the domain ot x be X, the domain 01' y be Y. 
Then, 
l\i!U,fL (x) III ... Max,.n tV) • 
Proot. Use will be :made ot (30), and the Identity, 
MaxzF(x} l1li ... Th~nx(- F(x»), 
which can be verified on inspeotion. Recall in (15). (16), 
the variable killed by MaXx or M1~ had domain X or Y. Then, 
May(:::) • !lIQXx(M1~ ... uAv), 
== rJfaXx~a~ ... \lAy, 
.. 1\11n, M'8.XxXA7 .. u,Av, 
== Mlny(u.AV ... n(y)} ... \lAV, 
.. UAV ... .M1Zly<'" n(,.)) ... uAv, 
l1li ... £iIaxyn (y) • 
Lemme. *2, XR'; 0 it and only it Y.P .. Y. 
YR, 0 it and only it lP .. x. 
Proot. It XR .; 0, then l':l1ay(x) > 0, x f.. X, and by Lemma 
11, Maxyn(y) < 0, 1 (Y. l~nce, Y oontains only points ot 
punishment, and yP III Y. 
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On the other hand, it yP - Y, Y contains only points ot 
punishment, and ~~xyn(y) < 0, y ~ Y. By Lemma 11 then, 
May(x) >0. x €. X,and XR r} O. The second stat$Ulent 
follows a symmetric argwnent. 
i£emma 13. XR., Q and YIi ., 0 it and only it XL ; 0 and YL " o. 
Proof. Let XR .. 0 and YR ., o. Ilhen, XL ,. 0 or XP .. X. The 
latter case is impossible, tor it true, lR ;. 0, by Lemma 12, 
violating the hypothesis. Ilene., XL ,. O. BY' interchanging 
X and Y in the argument, YL ., 0 also. 
Let XL ; 0 and YL ,,0. Then XR .. 0 or XR ., O. The 
latter ca.se 1s impossible, for it tru.e, yP • Y, and YL .. 0, 
violating the hypothesis. Hence D .. O. It tollows, by 
interchanging X a.nd Y, that YR • 0 also. 
Tbeorem '11 Every regular gam.e is in one and only one ot the 
three olasses detined by the oond1tions below. 
A. XR.. 0 and YR • o. 
B. lR; o. 
C. YR r O. 
In addition,equivalent conditions tor A, B. and OJ 
respeotively, are given in Lemma 12 and Lemma 13. 
Proot. A. B. and 0: exhaust all possibilities except XR '1 0 
and YR ; O. which 1s impossible by Lemma 12. Hence, they 
exhaust all regular games. Their mutual exclusiveness can 
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be seen immediately by th. torms of the oonditions. nenoe, 
every regular game must be in one and only one 01' the classes. 
Classes Band C are essentially the same type with an inter-
ohange of players. It XR ~ 0, then, by Lemma 12, YP • Y. 
Let Y be the oonvex set in the oond1tion$ 01' Theorem 6. 
Then, XR(p) and YP(p) are both. oonvex sets. By Criterion 2, 
eaoh 01' the players should seleot a strategy trom the oonvex 
set 01' tangenoy between X or Y and the eq,u.i-r&ward or equI-
punishment set tangent to X or Y. Let the reward on the 
equi-reward set be p.. Then, by Lemma 11, the punishment 
on the equi-punishment set is also pO. 
Theorem a, Let A be regular, u ~ U(A), v ~ VeA), p. the 
reward 01' an equI-reward .et tangent to X or Y. Then, eaoh 
01' the exhaustive, but mutuallY exolusive. olasses, given 
in 'Theorem. 7, have values and solutions as given below. 
A. It lR • 0 and YR • O. then ~(A) • uAv, 
XO = XL, y. = YL. 
B. It XR , 0, then A(A) • UAv + pO, 
XO • XR(p.). Y· • lP(pO). 
C. It YR .; 0, then A(A) =- uAv ... pO, 
X· • XP(p·), y •• YR(p.). 
Proot. A. Let XR =- 0 a.nd YR =- o. 1'tum XL .; 0 and yt .; O. 
Let xl/) t:, XL, y. e, YL, then, tor every x e. X, yo $, Y, 
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x" Ay 2!: Mlnyx· A1 III uAy + m (x") .. uAy, 
XAy" S MaXxUY· III uAv ... n ("10 ) .. uAv .. 
Combine these inequalities, with the result, 
x" A¥ 2: uAv 2!: xAy° j 
which displays statement A. 
B. Let x" ~ XR(p") , "1" ~ lP(p·). Then, tor every 
x ( X. Y t; Y. 
x"Ay ~ M1¥"Ay .. \lAv + m(xO) ?; uAv + p •• 
%.A:y0 S ~.~.:y. .. UAv ... n (y. ) :!i uAv + p •• 
That is, 
x· Ay ~ uAV + p" ?; xAyo. 
whioh displays statement B. 
C. Let XO E. XP(p·). y. ~ YR(p"). 'I'hen, tor eyery 
x e, X t Y €, Y t 
x°Ay ?; :M1V°A1' III uAv + m(x·) ?; uAy ... pO t 
xAy'0 S l'VlaXxxAyo • uAv ... n(yO) .s uAv .. p •• 
X"A::! ~ uAv ... p. ~ xlJ°, 
whioh displays statement O. 
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The operator, T(W.f,t,S), slve11 in (13) Is defined for 
an arbitrary game, A. It will be shown in this chapter that 
T divides all games ot a given size into sets ot games which 
are equivalent in a certain sense. So.me ot the invariants 
ot these classes ot equivalent games are investigated. In 
addition, the structural relationship between regular and 
irregular games Is studied. 
Equivalence ot A and fA 
Recall trom (13) that, 
B • TA • T(wij,y,tl,8j)A • D ... yE ... F ... G 
means that. 
bij • wpq (alj ... 8.iq- 8.pj ... 8.pq) ... Y ... t1 ... Sj, 
where. epqwpq • 1, and y,tl,SJ are completely arbitrary. 
The operator T(W' .r' ,tt .Sf) will be written 1ft. and s1m1larly 
'1''' etc. If the operation 1s iterated, say TT'A, a typical 
entry ot this element is 
wpq(w'rs(aij .. ais .. 8.r j ... 8.re) + y' ... ttl + gf j 
... w're(aiq - ais ... arq ... ars) ... yt ... tti ... S'q 
-wtrs{spj .... aps ... arj + are) _ yt _tf p - g' j 
+ w'rs(apq ... ape - arq ... are) ... yt + it + p g'q) 
+ y +, ti ... gj' 
whioh reduces to, 
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Wpq (aij .. aiq .. f:lpj ... ap(1) ... Y ... 1'i ... Sj' 
an entry of TA. That is, 
TT'A • TA. (21) 
Definition 2t If for some '1', 13 • TA, denote the relation 
between B and A by 13 r A. 
Theorem 9t BrA 1s an equivalence relation. 
Proof. Reflex! vi ty, symm.e.try, and trans! ti vi ty must be 
shown tor 13 r A. 
Reflexivity. Let T be selected by means of Ler.'WQ 6 in 
suoh a way that TA • A. Then, A r A. 
Symmetry. Let 13 r A, then B • TA. Seleot T' suoh that 
T'A. At and use (21). Then, 
A • TtA • TiTA • T'B, 
henoe, ArB. 
Transitivity_ Let C r B. B r A, then, 0 • TB, 13 • T'A. 
Choose 'I'M suoh that TffA • A. Then, 
henoe, Are. 
Let a set ot games ot the same size be given, say At A', 
Au ••••• Then, by (21), a fixed T will classify these games 
by the alternatives TA .. TAt or fA rJ TAt. In the tirst case, 
A and A' are in the same equivalenoe set, T(A). In the 
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latter case, A and At a.re not in the same equIva.lence set. 
On the other hand, by Lelmlla 6, an a.rbitrary game has a 
representation, A • TA to~ some T. Hence, all games are 
divided into classes of games 'where all games of a'single 
class a.re equivalent in the sense 01" Definition 2. 
'me relation betweenresular and irregular games is 
taken up now, and ultimat.ly 1"inds oharacterization in the 
arguments 01" T. Let a E, X'. b E'.. yf hereatter. 
LemPl!: 14, Let A be arbitrary. Then there exists,and can be 
constructed" a B • A + F + G whiCh is regular. 
1)1'001". By Lemma 5, U(B) ; 0 it and only it there exists no 
t which satisfies, 
(A + F + G)t • e. et • o. 
Let It be fixed, and detine g by the relation, 
Sj • 1- flkj tor all 3. 
let 1 be fixed, and detine t by the rela.tion, 
1"1 • 1 ... ail tor all 1. 
Suppose a set 01" t exists tor which et • O. Then, 
(aij + 1"i + gj)tj • aljtj + 1"teJtij + ejtj ... Qkjtj • 1. 
It et • 0, this reduces to, 
8.1jtj - 8.kJtj =- 1 tor all i. 
IrMs Is clearly impossible when i • k, tor the lett side is 
then zero. In a similar way. the detinition of twill 
guarantee that V(B) 1 o. 
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1'heorem 101 Let A be regular, u E. U(A), v l£. V(A)., 'rhen, 
A .. T(U,Vq.uAV,O,O)A. 
Proof. Recall the construction ot A in Lemma 6, and let 
Wpq .. upvq • 'rhen, 
A .. T(U1VJ'- UpapqYq •• pupaiqVq,Up8pJeqVq)A, 
.. '1'(U1V.1'. uAV,alqvq ,Upap.1)A. 
But by Lemma 9, the vectors in the last two argwnents are 
uAv tor all 1 or 3, hence. 
A .. T(UIV3'. UAv,UAve,uAve)A, 
.. D ... uAvE + UAvB + UAvE • 
.. D + uAvE, 
Corol.I£l 3, Let T .. T(albj'Y'O,O). ~en, a ~ V(TA) , 
b ~ V(TA) , Y .. a.TAb. (Oon •• quently, TA 1s regular.) 
Proot. substitute a into (7 t " with the result, 
8.1(8.1' (ai.1 ... 8.Iq ... apj + apq)bq + r 
... ftp(aUc ... a1q ... fipk + apq)b q ... Y) .. 0, 
which reduces to, 
&i(&13 - a1k} ~ ap(apJ ... &Pk) .. O. 
Both ten.;;; ·:.n the lett are ldent1 cal, hence a €. U (TA). 'I'he 
assertion tor b can be verifIed in a similar way, and TA 
is regular. Then using (81), TA" TTA, one can apply 
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Corollary 4, Let A be arbitrary. Then, A Can De written, 
A III T(UiVj,UBv,t,g)A, u ~ U(B). v ~ V(B), 
where B, t and g are detlned in Lemma 14. 
:Proof. Use Lemma 14 and Theorem. 10. 
Invariants ot T(A) 
Consider the following relations, 
uOi(alj ... aik) III 0, for all J, a fixed k, 
(6.i3 - akJ)voJ III 0, for all 1, Ii fixed k, 
eiuoi III 0, ejvoJ • 0, 
and let the set of all u· satisfying these relations be UO, 
the set ot all such v· be vo. 
r;['h~orem 11, UOCTA) III UOCA), V·(TA) III V·(A). 
Proot. U·(TA) is defined by the following relations, 
UOi(wpq(aiJ ... aiq .... 6.pJ ... 6.pq) + Y ... f1 ... 8j 
... Wpq (alk .. 6.1q .. apk ... apq) ... Y ... f1 ... ~) III 0, 
utepq'Wpq(aiJ .... a1lt) .. eiUOieq'Wpq(apJ ... apk;) 
... elu·l(gj .. 8k} III O. 
The last two terms are zero by definition ot u·, and 
uOl(alJ ... 81k) III O. 
Hence. u· E. U· (A). iI'he reduction is reversible, hence, the 
first assertion 1s true. A symmetric argument will 
demonstrate the second statement. 
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001'0118.1'15, IAt UO ( UO(A) , v· ~ VO(A), T· T(a1bJ'Y'o,O). 
Then, a + UO • U ( U(TA). b + yO • V ~ V(TA). 
Proot. Both a and u· satisty the homogeneous relations (7') 
and their sum will likewis. satisty the relations. Also, 
e(a + u·) • 1 + 0 • 1, so u satisties (10). A symmetric 
argument \'fill prove the assertion tor V. 
It may occur to the reader that an extension ot the 
equIvalence classificatioA,by dropping the requirement that 
epqwpq • 1 can be effected. In particu~ar, 1~eorem 9 and 
crheorem 11 do not need the restriotion. In taot, the entire 
function ot the restriotion is to guarantee that the expansion 
will represent the original xAy, and not a multiple ot xAy. 
In place of this extenslou, the reader is ret.,:ft'"ed to the 
concepts in Property 3B. 
In view ot the facts noted previously, nmaely, 
l(TA) • T(A) , UO(TA) • UO(A), VO(TA) • VetA), 
none ot these sets depend on A explicitly, except that A 
has generated a class ot elements, TA. Let an index, n, 
be assigned to each class, and writ., 
T • T(n) , UO • UOCn), Vo • VOen). 
ThUS, tor a given ", there is a set ot games, Or ruatrlces, 
and a subspace ot each I,mand En in correspondence. By 
means ot the results above, any regular game oan be 
expanded as a fUnotion ot" and T. 
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Theorem 12, Let UO ~ UO(rt) , v· ~ VO(n). A ~ T(n) , 
T .. T(a b ,r,OtO). Il'hen, tor x ~ X'. Y ~ yt. 
xTAy .. Y + (x - a - UO)A(y - b - yO). 
Proof. TA is regular by Qorollary 3. The values at P, Ut 
and v in 'rheorem 1 are given in Oorollary 3 and Corollary 5. 
Thus the expansion ot every regular game 1s a fUnotion 
of n and T. y has the etteet 01" translating the value ot the 
game, but alters the strategy considerations not at all. The 
essential oharaoter of all regular games in a olass is then 
contained in the subset a.etined by T l1li T(aib3'O,O,O) .. Tab' 
Call this subset TO(n), 
Theore 13, Every alemen' ot To (n) has the same rank. 
Proof. Let A be of minimum rank in T(n), say at rank r. 
'l"hen , an entry ot A can be wrl tten, 
81j • gl~kJ where k l1li 1,2 f •••• r. 
An entry of B ~ TO(n) is, 
bij .. ap(gl~kJ - 81khkq - SpkhkJ + gpkhkq)bq, 
III ap (Slk - 8pk) (hkj .. hkq) bq f 
III g'lkh'kJ' 
Now, B cannot be less than rank r, tor otherwise A is not of 
minimum rank. On the other hand, B oannot be of rank more 
than r, by reason ot the torm displayed above. Hence B is 
ot rank exactly r, and B is a typical element ot rO(11). 
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00rollar1 6.. Let the minlm:um rank in T(TT) be r. Then, 
every element of T(TT) is ot rank r, r ... 1, or r + 2, not 
exceeding 141n(m,n), and e.ery regular element of T(n) is 
of rank r or r ... 1.. In addition, 
r ;$ Min(m,n) .. 1. 
Proot... Any element at T(Tt) can be expressed by the Inethod 
in Theorem 15 as, tor a typical entry, 
bij· i'ith'k3 ... Y ... tl ... Sj ,k • 1,2, ... ,1". 
Now y can be absorbed in t or S, sinoe both are arbitrary. 
Hence, any element is ot ~ank ~t Most r ... a. It B is 
regular, it has a representation with t • 0, g • 0, and 
hence, is 01' rank at most r ... 1. For the last assertion, 
consider liJ,q' detined in (et), which is an element at ro (n) , 
and has a zero row and a zero column. 
Some Speoial Classes 
Elements and properties at some spec1al sets are 
displayed here to illustrate the analYsis above. 
T(1i:) , where the matrix E 1s taken as the index, 1s the 
set at all games 'With the typical entry, 
alj • apoq{l - 1 - 1 ... 1) ... Y + 1'1 ... gj' 
that is, 
A .. F ... G, 
where yE has been aosorbed into the arbitrary F and G. 
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To (lin contains only one elemtmt. the matrix 0, and. 
U· (E) == XI, V· (E) == Y'. 
The set or all regular games ot the class is yE, and the 
set ot all irregular games. is :r + Gt where t ;. eta or g ;. \3e. 
'r.he minimum rank Is zero, all regular elements are ot ranlt 
zero or one, and the irregular elements are ot ranl( one or 
two. 
T(I) J where I is the identity rnatrix (slluare), is the 
set ot all games with the typioal entry, where I .. (olj)' 
B.lj ~ 8 pbq (oij .. 0Iq- 0p3 + 0pq) ... Y + t1 + Sj • 
.. 013 - bi - 83 + ab + y + it + gj. 
That is, 
A ... 1 + :Ft- G, 
rO(I) contains all games ot the torm, 
\Pfhere to E. Xt , gO E. Y' .. 'lb.e spaces associated with I are 
the zero vectors, written as, 
UO(I) .. (0), VO(I) • (0). 
I ;. To ( I). and is translated by y .. lIn from. the game t 
I .. Ijn E., r" ( I) • 
frne minimum rank is n .. 1, which demonstrates the attainment 
ot the maximum given in the bound ot Corollary 6. 
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:.METHODS .A;ND OONJECTURES 
Methods 
Consider the game (2, p. 69), 
1 ... :3 0 
A- • 
.. 2 1 
° 
a 0 12 
This game is regular, and the subspaees assooiated with its 
class are the zero vector.. il"hat is, u· - (o). vo - (0). 
Then, there is a unique u or v. 1'h8Y turn out to be, on 
calculation by (7'), (8'), and (10), 
u - v • (12/23, 12/23, .. 1/23), uAv • .. 12/23. 
It is easy to see that, 
~taxi:Mlnjaij =- 0, 
and, since 
uAv + 111(X) • Mi~A1. 
uAv + May(x) .. I'I!a~nyxAy 2: t.laxIMinjaij - O. 
That is, 
Mayt(x) ~ ... uAv .. 12/23, 
hence, .RX ; 0, and by Lemma 12, py .. y. 
Consider the oone given by, x II1II U + y(z ... u), where 
z II1II (a, 1 - a, 0). By Theorem 4, m(x) II1II ym(z). X is a 
subset of this cone when 0 ::; a :5. 1, and y 2: 1 for all 
points of X. 
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By definition, 
l'hat is, 
m(z) .. MinyZAy ... uAv. 
• M[n(3a ... 34/23, 35/23 ... Sa, 12/23). 
m(z) .. 3a, ... 34/23 when (t S 1/2, 
m{z) .. 35/23- 3a when (1 ~ 1/2. 
The punishment, limbo, and reward sets oan then be 
seen by comparing m(z) with zero. '1l1is gives, 
z ~ P when u < 54/69 and a > 35/69, 
z ~ L when a .. 34/69 and « .. 35/69, 
z ~ R when 34/69 < ~ < 35/69. 
The homogeneity ot punishment, limbo, and reward makes it 
easy to see that these sets are oones with vertioes at u. 
'rhe limbo halt-rays separate the punismlent and reward sets, 
and serve as asymptotes tQr equi-reward or equi-punismnent 
ourves in the plane X'. By the symmetry, it is apparent 
that the point ot tangenoy between X and an equi-reward 
set will be along the halr-ray defined by (l ., 1/2, out trom 
u as tar as possible, namely to (0, o. 1). 'rhen, 
~~(x) • 12/23 .. pO. 
Thus, (0, 0, 1) is optimal, and A .. uAv ... p ... o. 
Let y .. v ... y(z ... v). z defined as above. '!'hen, 
n(y) ., yn(z). By oalculation, 
n(z) • - MaxxXAZ ... uAv, 
• ... ~mx(3a ... 34/23. 35/23 - 3a, 12/23), 
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which becomes, 
n(z) • 3a - 35/23 when a ~ 1/3, 
n(z) • - 12/23 when 1/3 ~ Q. ;$ 2/3, 
n(z) • 34/23 - ~ when a ~ 2/3. 
Py has only punishing pOints, hence wants to stay as close 
to v as I}Ossible on a.ny given halt-ray trom. v. This set ot 
points is z when 0 S a S 1, and by inspection above, 
l&axzn(z) • - 12/23 when 1/3 ~ a S 2/3, 
and z so defined Is opt1m.l tor P,... It is interesting to 
note that the curves ot equi-punishment in yt are straight 
line segments inSide the aubset where 0 < a < 1, and curvi-
- -
linear elsewhere. 
OOIlJ e ot'\.U"es 
t~le relation between regular and irregular games needs 
further eXamination, espeoially the role ot F and G as 
functions ot the solutions ot the irregular games. One 
specific inquiry would be the following_ 
Question 1, Let A be irregular. When does there exist a 
5, F. and G such that B ia regular, and, 
A •. B ... F ... G, 
XO(B)XO(F) ~ 0, yO(B)yO(G) ~ O? 
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It the intersection of either player listed were not 
zero, then the set would be optiIl1al. 
l.'he analysis has treated aJ1 entire given game with no 
deletion ot its components. However, certain ga:m.es are 
eith.er SOlvable on inspeotion, or oan be simplified by easily 
seen deletions. It would be 8.n adVantage it these games 
oould be reoognized within the framework 01' the analysis, 
A stri otll de,terzq1ned game A is a game such the. t t 
I~xl1ttnjaiJ • M1nJ!~iaijt 
and is solvable on inspection. ;I.!;very class, T(n) J has 
strictly determined games, tor instanoe, ~qJ and these 
grunss may be regular or irregular. As examples, E, F, and 
G B..re strictly determined. but l~ is regular while ]' and G 
are irre~11ar in general. 
11uestion 2, Oan the condition that til game be strictly 
determined be expressed entirely as a tunction 01' T? 
;Jyrmlletrlc games have taken on new importance recently 
pp. 73), (2, pp. 81), with certain oomputational methods 
01' solution, and new methods 01' sywuetrizlng arb1trary games. 
A sr.mnetric game has a ske\V-symrlletric payott matrix and it 
is ea.sily verified that t1 .. V. Henoe, it the pa.yoff is A, 
uAv • 0. '\l\I'hich lU.eans that it A is rebl'lllar, then A f. re (rr). 
'l"hon by Theorem 13, unless theminimu.lll rank 01' a olass is even 
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there exist no regular symmetric games in the class. It 
can be shown easily that a necessary and sufficient oondition 
that a class have either a. sYltl:rlletric or skew .... syrnruetric pe:yoft 
l:uatri:x is that Taa produce a sym;m.etric or skew",sYluul.etric 
matrix, respectIvely. This means, then, that a class cannot 
have both a syrmnetrlc a.nd a sktSf".synunetric matrix. 
Sinoe the elements ot a class play no special role in 
its definition, it seams that some particular T mi~lt be 
convenient to display an Sle111ent of' each cla.ss for oompa.rison 
and identifica.tion purpos.,s. 'v\!ith no baSis to ravor one a or 
b over another, it seems reasonable to let a. • elm, b • e/n. 
If this were done, this representative element would display 
the ex'stence ot s~mnetrlc or akew-synlmetrlc elements in the 
class immediately. 
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